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Wrestling with the Eleatics in Plato’s Parmenides 
 
In his Lives, Diogenes Laertius classifies Platonic dialogues 
into several types, including gymnastikos and agōnistikos forms of 
inquiry; the latter are aimed at victory, the former at training the 
mind.2 Although he classifies the Parmenides as neither of these but 
rather as one for instruction in metaphysics,3 we believe that the 
dialogue illustrates Plato’s adaptation of athletic techniques to 
philosophical inquiry on several levels. To demonstrate this, we 
will examine the Parmenides’s setting, its method, and its theory. 
On all three levels, we find an important connection between 
                                                     
1 Lidia Palumbo is professor of ancient philosophy at the Università degli Studi 
di Napoli Federico II. She is co-editor of the series Philosophike Skepsis, and 
author of Il non essere e l’apparenza. Sul Sofista di Platone (Napoli 1996), 
Mimesis: Rappresentazione, teatro e mondo nei dialoghi di Platone e nella Poetica 
di Aristotle (Napoli 2008), Verba manent, su Platone e il linguaggio (Napoli 
2014), and many articles on Plato and Aristotle’s Poetics. She is currently 
working on the theatrical and protreptic dimensions of Platonic texts. 
Heather L. Reid was introduced in the first essay of the volume. This 
collaborative essay was completed during her Fulbright residence in 
Napoli, which was co-sponsored by the Foundation Con il Sud. 
2 Diogenes Laertius 3.49: “Of the Platonic dialogues there are two most general 
types, the one adapted for instruction and the other for inquiry…The 
dialogue of inquiry also has two main divisions, the one of which aims at 
training the mind and the other at victory in controversy. Again, the part 
which aims at training the mind has two subdivisions, the one akin to the 
midwife's art, the other merely tentative. And that suited to controversy is 
also subdivided into one part which raises critical objections, and another 
which is subversive of the main position. Τοῦ δὴ <δια>λόγου τοῦ 
Πλατωνικοῦ δύ᾽ εἰσὶν ἀνωτάτω χαρακτῆρες, ὅ τε ὑφηγητικὸς καὶ ὁ 
ζητητικός… τοῦ δὲ ζητητικοῦ καὶ αὐτοῦ δύο εἰσὶν οἱ πρῶτοι χαρακτῆρες, 
ὅ τε γυμναστικὸς καὶ ἀγωνιστικός. καὶ τοῦ μὲν γυμναστικοῦ μαιευτικός 
τε καὶ πειραστικός, τοῦ δὲ ἀγωνιστικοῦ ἐνδεικτικὸς καὶ ἀνατρεπτικός.” 
For an analysis, see F. Ferrari, “La nascita del platonismo,” in Princeps 
Philosophorum. Platone nell'Occidente tardo-antico, medievale e umanistico, eds. 
M. Borriello and A.M.Vitale (Roma: Città Nuova, 2016), 13-29. 
3 Diogenes Laertius 3.50. The fact that the Parmenides does not appear in the 
category of zetetic or gymnastic dialogues in this classification (presumably 
derived from Middle Platonism) demonstrates only that it was interpreted 
differently than the others. 
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philosophy and agōn, a specifically gymnastic or training agōn that 
is aimed not at victory or defeat of one’s opponent, but 
constructively toward the achievement of a philosophical “vision,” 
which is achieved by overcoming the theoretical challenges that 
philosophers encounter on their path.  
This essay interprets the Parmenides agonistically as a 
constructive contest between Plato’s Socrates and the Eleatics of 
Western Greece. Not only is the dialogue set in the agonistic 
context of the Panathenaic Games, it features agonistic language, 
employs an agonistic method, and may even present an agonistic 
model for participation in the forms. The inspiration for this 
agonistic motif may be that Parmenides and his student Zeno 
represent Western Greece, which was a key rival for the mainland 
at the Olympics and other Panhellenic festivals. This athletic 
rivalry was complemented by a philosophical rivalry, which is 
dramatized in the dialogue by pitting a very young (flyweight) 
Socrates against the Eleatic (heavyweight) Parmenides. Through 
dialectic, an agonistic form of philosophy attributed to the Eleatics, 
Plato subjects his theory of forms to a variety of conceptual 
challenges. This process is described as gymnasia (training) at 135d, 
and the power of dialectic and philosophy itself are said to depend 
on it.  
The goal of the gymnasia (136c) is to achieve a full view (kyriōs 
diopsesthai) of the truth. This philosophical “vision” corresponds to 
the physical fitness achieved through athletic training, and it 
distinguishes philosophers (lovers of wisdom) from philotheamones 
(lovers of images) as explained at Republic 475d-476c. Just as 
trained athletes are able to participate in the contest while 
spectators merely watch it, philosophers are able to discern 
intelligible forms through the particulars that participate in them. 
In the words of the Seventh Letter 341c, it takes prolonged 
communion (synousia) with a subject to ignite the philosophical 
light in one’s soul. The Parmenides’s gymnasia provides an agonistic 
model for this process, inviting its readers to participate in 
philosophical training and develop a vison that transcends the 
material in a way these Eleatic spectators were unable to do. 
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Setting and Characters 
The Parmenides has an athletic setting and its philosophical 
characters are compared to athletes. We learn at 127a, that 
Parmenides and his protégé, Zeno, have come to Athens εἰς 
Παναθήναια τὰ μεγάλα, for the Greater Panathenaic Games.4 
The Panathenaia was a local religious festival honoring Athena 
that took place annually. Every fourth year, athletic contests were 
added and athletes came from all over the Hellenic world to 
compete for the sacred olive oil contained in Panathenaic prize 
vases, which can be seen today in museums all over the world. 
Although these games, like all the “money” games that awarded 
valuable prizes, were less prestigious than the “crown” games at 
Olympia, Delphi, Nemea and Isthmia, they grew to become an 
important Panhellenic event. And just as the Olympic Games 
provided an opportunity for intellectuals to gather and exchange 
ideas, the Greater Panathenaia would be a likely occasion—
perhaps the only likely occasion—upon which Socrates would 
meet the Eleatic philosophers. Socrates rarely wandered far from 
Athens, unlike Plato who travelled to Olympia and Western 
Greece. 
The dialogue’s narrator, Cephalus (whose name suggests the 
beginning of something)5 says that he has traveled to Athens from 
Clazomenae in Asia Minor—home of the pre-Socratic philosopher 
Anaxagoras.6 It is not clear whether the Clazomenians were also in 
                                                     
4 See S. Campese and S. Gastaldi, “Bendidie e Panatenee,” in Platone, La 
Repubblica, vol. I, bk. I, trans. M. Vegetti (Napoli: Bibliopolis, 1998), 109-131.  
5 In this case, the beginning of the Platonic dialogues, since Socrates is younger 
here than in any other dialogue. On the possibility of ordering Plato’s 
dialogues according to the dramatic context of Socrates’s age, see C. H. 
Zuckert, “Plato's Parmenides: A dramatic Reading,” The Review of 
Metaphysics, 51.4 (1998): 875-906, and C. H. Zuckert, Plato’s Philosophers. The 
Coherence of the Dialogues (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2009). 
See also M.L. Declos, “Instituer la philosophie: le temps de la succession 
dans le Parménide de Platon,” in C. Darbo-Peschanski (ed.), Constructions 
du temps dans le monde grec ancien, (Paris: CNRS Éditions, 2000), 223-52. 
6 On the reference to Clazomenae, see F. Forcignanò, Forme, linguaggio, sostanze. Il 
dibattito sulle idee nell'Academia antica, (Milano-Udine: Mimesis: 2017), 55. 
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town for (a later edition) of the Festival, but it is well-attested by 
the distribution of Panathenaic amphorae in tombs that 
delegations from Asia Minor as well as Western Greece attended 
the Games. In fact, athletes from Sicily and Southern Italy, 
particularly the city of Croton, were so dominant that a proverb 
claimed, “The last of the Crotonites is the first of the rest of the 
Greeks.”7 Croton, of course, is also the adopted home of 
Pythagoras,8 who very likely had a hand in its athletes’ success, 
and certainly had a major influence on Western Greek thinkers 
including Empedocles, Parmenides, and Zeno. That Plato was 
aware of the athletic side of Pythagoreanism is suggested by his 
decision to set up a school in the Academy gymnasium9 upon 
returning from a voyage to Syracuse and Taranto, where he met 
the Pythagorean Archytas10 who, by one account, rescued the 
Athenian from slavery after a later voyage. 
The point is that the athletic rivalry between Mainland and 
Western Greeks was accompanied in Plato’s mind by a 
philosophical rivalry. Furthermore, as a former wrestler,11 Plato 
would have understood this rivalry as a constructive one in which 
good competition serves to improve the competitors. By pitting a 
very young Socrates against the venerable Eleatic Parmenides in 
dialectic (a form of inquiry attributed to Zeno),12 Plato subjects his 
theory of forms to a variety of conceptual challenges in the effort 
to make it stronger. The dialogue’s participants are also described 
in athletic terms. Parmenides compliments Socrates for his hormē 
                                                     
7 Strabo, Geographia 6.1.12. 
8 For a discussion of Pythagoras’s influence on athletics see Heather L. Reid, 
“Plato the Gymnasiarch,” in ΦΙΛΕΛΛΗΝ: Essays for Stephen G. Miller, eds. 
D. Katsonopoulou & E. Partida, Athens: The Helike Society, 171-186, p 173. 
9 Diogenes Laertius, 3.7. 
10 Diogenes Laertius 3.21-22. 
11 Diogenes Laertius, 3.1.4. 
12 According to Diogenes Laertius 8.2.57, Aristotle in his Sophist calls Empedocles 
the inventor of rhetoric and Zeno of dialectic. “φησὶ δ᾽ Ἀριστοτέλης 
εὑρετὴν [Ζήνων] γενέσθαι διαλεκτικῆς, ὥσπερ Ἐμπεδοκλέα ῥητορικῆς.” 
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toward argument13—an athletic word that suggests the eagerness 
of a runner or racehorse bursting from the starting gate. Zeno, 
meanwhile, confesses to writing his book out of “competitive 
spirit” (philonikia), a vice that Plato takes to be characteristic of 
athletes and sophists.14 It is worth noting, as well, that Plato 
himself is engaged in the parallel act of writing a book to 
competitively defend his theory of forms. 
Finally, Parmenides himself is compared with the aging 
racehorse in a song from the Western Greek poet, Ibycus: 
I am obliged to go along with you. And yet I feel like the 
horse in the poem of Ibycus. Ibycus compares himself to 
a horse—a champion but no longer young, on the point 
of drawing a chariot in a race and trembling at what 
experience tells him is about to happen—and says that he 
himself, old man that he is, is being forced against his will 
to compete in Love’s game. I too, when I think back, feel 
a good deal of anxiety as to how at my age I am to make 
my way across such a vast and formidable sea of words.  
ἀνάγκη, φάναι, πείθεσθαι. καίτοι δοκῶ μοι τὸ τοῦ 
Ἰβυκείου ἵππου πεπονθέναι, ᾧ ἐκεῖνος ἀθλητῇ ὄντι καὶ 
πρεσβυτέρῳ, ὑφ᾽ ἅρματι μέλλοντι ἀγωνιεῖσθαι καὶ δι᾽ 
ἐμπειρίαν τρέμοντι τὸ μέλλον, ἑαυτὸν ἀπεικάζων 
ἄκων ἔφη καὶ αὐτὸς οὕτω πρεσβύτης ὢν εἰς τὸν ἔρωτα 
                                                     
13 130b: Παρμενίδην: ὦ Σώκρατες, φάναι, ὡς ἄξιος εἶ ἄγασθαι τῆς ὁρμῆς τῆς 
ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους (“what an admirable talent for argument you have!”). Also, 
135d: καλὴ μὲν οὖν καὶ θεία, εὖ ἴσθι, ἡ ὁρμὴ ἣν ὁρμᾷς ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους 
(Your impulse towards dialectic is noble and divine). 
14 128de: διὰ τοιαύτην δὴ φιλονικίαν ὑπὸ νέου ὄντος ἐμοῦ ἐγράφη, καί τις αὐτὸ 
ἔκλεψε γραφέν… ταύτῃ οὖν σε λανθάνει, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅτι οὐχ ὑπὸ νέου 
φιλονικίας οἴει αὐτὸ γεγράφθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ὑπὸ πρεσβυτέρου φιλοτιμίας. “In 
that competitive spirit, I wrote the book when I was a young man. […] So in 
this respect, I think you missed the point, Socrates, you think it was written 
not out of a young man’s competitiveness but out of a mature man’s 
vainglory.” Both philonikia and philotimia are considered by Plato to be vices 
characteristic of athletes and sophists. See M. Tabak, Plato's Parmenides 
Reconsidered, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 31-2. 
 
Lidia Palumbo & Heather L. Reid 
190 
ἀναγκάζεσθαι ἰέναι: κἀγώ μοι δοκῶ μεμνημένος μάλα 
φοβεῖσθαι πῶς χρὴ τηλικόνδε ὄντα διανεῦσαι τοιοῦτόν 
τε καὶ τοσοῦτον πέλαγος λόγων. (136e-137a15) 
By 137b, however, Parmenides has agreed “to play the strenuous 
game” (πραγματειώδη παιδιὰν παίζειν) he has been 
recommending to Socrates.16 After all, he observes, they are by 
themselves—no one is watching. 
Method: the “Gymnasia” 
At 135c, the “game” in question is actually called “gymnasia” 
(training) and Parmenides tells Socrates that nothing less than the 
power of dialectic and the future of philosophy depend on it.17 
Dialectic, as we said, was a form of inquiry attributed by Aristotle 
to Zeno of Elea.18 The method demonstrated by Parmenides in the 
dialogue is certainly an example of Eleatic dialectic.19 But why, 
apart from its affinity with athletic contest, is this dialectic called 
gymnasia? The first hint comes from the aforementioned comments 
about it taking place in private.20 At 136de, Zeno says it would not 
                                                     
15 Unless otherwise stated, all English translations of Plato are taken from John 
Cooper, ed., Plato: Complete Works (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997). 
16 It is significant that Parmenides uses the terms paidia/paizein here (to play a 
game), which suggests the sophists’ abuse of philosophical tools such as 
dialectic. In our interpretation, the Eleatics are presented in the Parmenides 
as practitioners of a sophistical dialectic, whereas Socrates, here at the 
beginning of his career, and thanks to the training that he is beginning to 
undergo, is capable of authentically philosophical dialectic. On sophistry as 
a game, see Plato, Sophist, 234b-235a. 
17 135c: “’In this way he [who does not allow for forms] will destroy the power of 
dialectic entirely. But I think you are only too well aware of that./ ‘What you 
say is true,’ Socrates said./ ‘What then will you do about philosophy? Where 
will you turn, while these difficulties remain unresolved?’…καὶ οὕτως τὴν 
τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δύναμιν παντάπασι διαφθερεῖ. τοῦ τοιούτου μὲν οὖν 
μοι δοκεῖς καὶ μᾶλλον ᾐσθῆσθαι. ἀληθῆ , φάναι. τί οὖν ποιήσεις 
φιλοσοφίας πέρι; πῇ τρέψῃ ἀγνοουμένων τούτων;” 
18 See n. 12 above. 
19 On the Eleatic method in Plato’s Parmenides, see Samuel Scolnicov, Plato's 
Parmenides (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003). 
20 The lack of spectators transforms the dialectic from a public agōn (the prefix ag- 
indicates a public gathering) into a private gymnasia (training exercise). 
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be appropriate to ask Parmenides to perform the gymnasia in 
public: 
…it’s not fitting, especially for a man his age, to engage in 
such a discussion in front of a crowd. Ordinary people 
don’t know that without this comprehensive and 
circuitous treatment we cannot hit upon the truth and 
gain insight. 
εἰ μὲν οὖν πλείους ἦμεν, οὐκ ἂν ἄξιον ἦν δεῖσθαι: 
ἀπρεπῆ γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα πολλῶν ἐναντίον λέγειν 
ἄλλως τε καὶ τηλικούτῳ: ἀγνοοῦσιν γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ ὅτι 
ἄνευ ταύτης τῆς διὰ πάντων διεξόδου τε καὶ πλάνης 
ἀδύνατον ἐντυχόντα τῷ ἀληθεῖ νοῦν σχεῖν. 
Just as athletes train privately in the gymnasium and compete 
publically in the games, philosophers need to train in private 
before they perform in public.21 And once a champion like 
Parmenides is past his prime, his experience is of special value in 
training younger competitors, such as Socrates.22 By Plato’s time, 
                                                     
21 A similar point about training in private before performing in public is made at 
Gorgias 514e: “by Heaven, Callicles, would it not in truth be ridiculous that 
men should descend to such folly that, before having plenty of private 
practice, sometimes with indifferent results, sometimes with success, and so 
getting adequate training in the art, they should, as the saying is, try to learn 
pottery by starting on a wine-jar, and start public practice themselves and 
invite others of their like to do so? Do you not think it would be mere folly 
to act thus? πρὸς Διός, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, οὐ καταγέλαστον ἂν ἦν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, 
εἰς τοσοῦτον ἀνοίας ἐλθεῖν ἀνθρώπους, ὥστε, πρὶν ἰδιωτεύοντας πολλὰ 
μὲν ὅπως ἐτύχομεν ποιῆσαι, πολλὰ δὲ κατορθῶσαι καὶ γυμνάσασθαι 
ἱκανῶς τὴν τέχνην, τὸ λεγόμενον δὴ τοῦτο ἐν τῷ πίθῳ τὴν κεραμείαν 
ἐπιχειρεῖν μανθάνειν, καὶ αὐτούς τε δημοσιεύειν ἐπιχειρεῖν καὶ ἄλλους 
τοιούτους παρακαλεῖν; οὐκ ἀνόητόν σοι δοκεῖ ἂν εἶναι οὕτω πράττειν;” 
22 Parmenides, in this dialogue, plays not only the role of a critic, but also a 
defender of the Theory of Forms. The two roles are unified in the figure of 
the objector (ὁ ἀμφισβητῶν, 133b8, cfr. 135a), in which he poses questions 
to train Socrates, who has to respond and defend the Theory of Forms. On 
the role of the respondent, see M.L. Kakkuri-Knuuttila, “The Role of the 
Respondent in Plato and Aristotle,” in The Development of Dialectic from Plato 
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the training of both athletes and philosophers actually took place 
in the gymnasium and only the former competed in the Games. 
Parmenides, however, may well have performed his philosophical 
poem competitively during his prime. Indeed, the rhetorical 
contests that Plato derides may have descended from competition 
among serious philosophers like Parmenides and Empedocles.23  
In any case, the gymnasia demonstrated in the Parmenides has 
the flavor of a master sparring privately with his students, as we 
see the mature Socrates doing in such dialogues as Charmides, 
Lysis, and Theaetetus—all of which are set in palaistrai or 
gymnasia.24 Indeed, the Theaetetus echoes several of the 
Parmenides’s gymnastic themes. For example, Theodorus is 
reluctant to enter the “contest” (helkein pros to gymnàsion) and asks 
Socrates to (labe) “get a hold on” Theaetetus in the argument 
(162ab); also, Theaetetus agrees to wrestle only upon the 
agreement that Socrates and Theodorus will “put him upright” 
(epanorthō) if he falls (146c). Helping your opponent to his feet is a 
common feature of combat sports training. This atmosphere of 
friendly competition is compounded in Parmenides by Zeno’s and 
Parmenides’s obvious delight in Socrates’s challenge to their ideas 
at 130a; if the atmosphere were one of philonikia, such criticism 
might draw contempt. Although some scholars see the defeat 
either of Socrates or Parmenides in the dialectic,25 the very fact that 
                                                     
to Aristotle, ed. Jakob L. Fink (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2012), 62-90.  
23 See N. Benzi, Philosophy in Verse: Competition and Early Greek Philosophical 
Thought, thesis, Durham University. 2016 http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/11568/, 
181-186. 
24 L. Coventry, “The Role of the Interlocutor in Plato’s Dialogues, Theory and 
Practice,” in Characterization and Individuality in Greek Literature, ed. Ch. 
Pelling (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 174-196. 
25 We do not believe that the Parmenides depicts a dialectical defeat of Socrates, 
but rather shows how Parmenides’s objections to his theory are ultimately 
inconsistent. For another interpretation of the text from this perspective, see 
F. Ferrari, Platone, Parmenide (Milano: Bur, 2004); A. Graeser, “Parmenides 
in Plato’s Parmenides,” in Issues in the Philosophy of Language. Past and Present 
(Bern: Peter Lang Publishing, 1999), 43-56; M. Tabak, Plato’s Parmenides 
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it is unclear who “wins” illustrates that this gymnasia is a form of 
mutually-beneficial training rather than a winner-take-all 
contest.26  
The Parmenides’s dialectic is called gymnasia, above all, 
because it is a form of preparation. Let’s go back to where 
Parmenides asks Socrates what he will do about philosophy if his 
questions about the forms remain unresolved. “I don’t think I have 
anything clearly in view,” replies the young Socrates, “at least not 
at present” (135c). Parmenides responds: 
Socrates, that’s because you are trying to mark off 
something beautiful, and just, and good, and each one of 
the forms, too soon…[prin gymnasthēnai] before you have 
been properly trained. I noticed that the other day too, as 
I listened to you conversing with Aristotle here. The 
impulse [hormē] you bring to argument is noble and 
divine, make no mistake about it. But while you are still 
young put your back into it and get more training 
[gymnasai] through something people think useless—
what the crowd call idle talk. Otherwise the truth will 
escape you. 
πρῲ γάρ, εἰπεῖν, πρὶν γυμνασθῆναι, ὦ Σώκρατες, 
ὁρίζεσθαι ἐπιχειρεῖς καλόν τέ τι καὶ δίκαιον καὶ 
ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἓν ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν. ἐνενόησα γὰρ καὶ 
                                                     
Reconsidered (New York: Palgrave, 2015), 29: "Part I is clearly a satirical 
display of various objections to the theory of Forms, which are invalid, non 
sequitur reactions to the theory of Forms that smack of sophistry.” 
26 The gymnasia benefits Socrates (or the critical reader of Socrates) by subjecting 
the theory of forms to the Eleatics’ critical examination, so he can overcome 
some important theoretical challenges (attributable partly to his young age). 
But it also benefits Parmenides (or the critical reader of Parmenides), by 
revealing certain materialistic biases in the Eleatic criticism of Socrates. On 
this last point, see F. Ferrari, “Equiparazionismo ontologico e deduttivismo: 
l’eredità di Parmenide nella gymnasia del Parmenide,” in Il quinto secolo. Studi 
di filosofia antica in onore di Livio Rossetti, eds. S. Giombini and F. Marcacci 
(Aguaplano: Officina del libro, Passignano, 2010), 357-368. On the text’s 
instruction of the reader, see A.K. Cotton, Platonic Dialogue and the Education 
of the Reader (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
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πρῴην σου ἀκούων διαλεγομένου ἐνθάδε Ἀριστοτέλει 
τῷδε. καλὴ μὲν οὖν καὶ θεία, εὖ ἴσθι, ἡ ὁρμὴ ἣν ὁρμᾷς 
ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους: ἕλκυσον δὲ σαυτὸν καὶ γύμνασαι 
μᾶλλον διὰ τῆς δοκούσης ἀχρήστου εἶναι καὶ 
καλουμένης ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἀδολεσχίας, ἕως ἔτι νέος 
εἶ: εἰ δὲ μή, σὲ διαφεύξεται ἡ ἀλήθεια. (135d) 
The image of truth “escaping” the hold of a wrestler is unavoidable 
here. Young Socrates wants to learn the old champion’s technique. 
“What matter of training is that? (τίς οὖν ὁ τρόπος…τῆς 
γυμνασίας;),” he asks (135d).  
The method that Parmenides describes is a special type of 
dialectic—a kind of round-robin reductio. Reductio ad absurdum 
works by hypothesizing the opposite of what you want to prove 
and then showing that the consequences are absurd. Standard 
dialectic envisions an objector who challenges each hypothesis—
not unlike a wrestling match. What Parmenides proposes is a 
comprehensive system that subjects a hypothesis and its opposite 
to a series of reductio challenges, then analyzes the consequences.27 
Ancient wrestling tournaments were single elimination, with 
wrestlers drawing lots to determine matches and the winners 
advancing until a victor was determined.28 Parmenides’s method 
looks more like a round-robin tournament, in which each 
competitor faces every other competitor—as in the group play 
phase of the FIFA World Cup.29 The round-robin method is less 
efficient at picking winners, but it has the advantage of revealing 
each contestant’s individual strengths and weaknesses. It makes 
sense, furthermore, to prepare for a competition, in which one 
never knows exactly who one will be wrestling, by testing oneself 
against everyone else in the gymnasium who can provide an 
                                                     
27 For a summary of the structure of the gymnasia, see F. Fronterotta, Guida alla 
lettura del Parmenide di Platone (Roma-Bari, Laterza, 1998).  
28 Michael B. Poliakoff, Combat Sports in the Ancient World (Yale University Press, 
1987), 22. 
29 In the gymnasia, not only does the one confront the many, and the many—each 
alone and all together—confront the one, but it also happens that Socrates 
confronts Parmenides and Zeno, and then each of them separately. 
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appropriate challenge. This is the kind of “comprehensive and 
circuitous treatment” (διὰ πάντων διεξόδου τε καὶ πλάνης) Zeno 
describes at 136e. So Parmenides’s gymnasia is private, cooperative, 
comprehensive preparation, akin to that undertaken in traditional 
gymnasia by athletes preparing for the Games. But what, exactly, 
is the philosopher training for? 
Theory: Philosophical Vision 
The theory and method of the Parmenides come together in the 
idea of a philosophical vision. The dialogue’s theoretical 
background holds that material particulars participate in 
intelligible forms without being identical to them or completely 
separate. At 136c, Parmenides says to Socrates that he must 
complete the gymnasia in order to “achieve a full view (kyriōs 
diopsesthai) of truth.” The goal of the philosopher’s gymnasia, then, 
is to develop the “vision” by which sensible objects can be 
distinguished from intelligible forms, and the latter discerned 
through the former’s participation in them. In other words, the 
gymnastic method cultivates a capacity to see things 
philosophically just as athletic exercises cultivate the capacity to 
wrestle competitively. Specifically, the philosopher is able to look 
beyond particulars as they show up superficially in our sense-data 
and see through to the ideals in which they participate. This is 
because the round-robin reductio, discussed above, forces us to 
imagine and consider all of the different consequences of each 
hypothesis. The challenge provided by opposing hypotheses, 
which is the basic method of dialectic, pushes us to transcend the 
limitations of material reality (135e) and to consider what exists 
only in the intelligible realm. In addition, by forcing us to consider 
what would be if things were opposite, it renders the invisible 
visible, considers the possibility of the apparently impossible, and 
in short evokes that sense of wonder characteristic of philosophers 
(not to mention the sense of possibility characteristic of sport).30 
Such a concept of philosophical vision is illustrated in Republic 
V, appropriately enough with a contrast between spectators 
                                                     
30 See L. Palumbo, “La meravigliosa struttura dell’ ‘altrimenti’. Una lettura del 
Parmenide di Platone,” Archivio di Storia della Cultura – Anno XXXIII-2020. 
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(philotheamones) who love to watch festivals, and philosophers who 
“love the sight of truth.” At 476b, spectators are described as those 
able to see the many beautiful things but not the beautiful itself.31 
A philosopher, by contrast,  
believes in the beautiful itself, can see both it and the 
things that participate in it and doesn’t believe that the 
participants are it or that it itself is the participants. 
ἡγούμενός τέ τι αὐτὸ καλὸν καὶ δυνάμενος καθορᾶν 
καὶ αὐτὸ καὶ τὰ ἐκείνου μετέχοντα, καὶ οὔτε τὰ 
μετέχοντα αὐτὸ οὔτε αὐτὸ τὰ μετέχοντα ἡγούμενος. 
(476cd) 
What is interesting, maybe even ironic,32 is that the heavyweight 
philosopher Parmenides himself seems to lack such vision because 
the mistake he makes in the dialogue is precisely to fail to 
distinguish between forms and particulars,33 immaterial and 
material.34 For example, when Socrates tries to explain the relation 
                                                     
31 Republic 476b: “The lovers of sights and sounds like beautiful sounds, colors, 
shapes, and everything fashioned out of them, but their thought is unable 
to see and embrace the nature of the beautiful itself. φιλήκοοι καὶ 
φιλοθεάμονες τάς τε καλὰς φωνὰς ἀσπάζονται καὶ χρόας καὶ σχήματα 
καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων δημιουργούμενα, αὐτοῦ δὲ τοῦ καλοῦ 
ἀδύνατος αὐτῶν ἡ διάνοια τὴν φύσιν ἰδεῖν τε καὶ ἀσπάσασθαι.” On this 
passage, see F. Ferrari, “Teoria delle idee e ontologia,” in Platone, Repubblica 
vol. iv, bk. 5, ed. M. Vegetti, (Napoli: Bibliopolis, 2000), 365-91. 
32 G. A. Press, Plato: A Guide for the Perplexed (London-New York: Continuum, 
2007), 70 writes: "If they [Plato’s dialogues] are attempts to communicate 
theories, concepts and doctrines that are Plato’s own, they do not do so 
directly, but only indirectly through the mediation of [...] literary and 
dramatic machinery." 
33 The gymnasia, the lengthy discourse proposed by Parmenides in the last part of 
the dialogue, is the Platonic way of demonstrating the absurd, self-
contradictory, and therefore ridiculous conclusions arrived at by a 
sophistical Eleatism, which dialectically questions the ontological difference 
between forms and particulars. 
34 This materialistic aspect of the Eleatic argument is crucial. It is evident in the 
entire Eleatic perspective, which conceives the relationship between the 
forms and particulars, or between the one and the many, in terms of a 
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between form and particular using the metaphor of the light of 
day, Parmenides counters with the materialistic example of a sail 
(131bc).35 The Eleatic is presented as hopelessly attached to the 
material world. 
Like several Platonic dialogues, the Parmenides not only 
discusses dialectic, it attempts to engage the reader in practicing it. 
On Plato’s view, philosophy requires active participation. Just as 
the wrestler improves through engagement with other wrestlers, 
the philosopher improves through engagement with other 
philosophers, and it is through this dialectical wrestling with each 
other that they both move closer to the ideal.36 Socrates’s refusal to 
write at all and Plato’s insistence on writing only dialogues are 
evidence for this belief. The Seventh Letter, meanwhile, states it 
specifically: 
Unlike other sciences, [philosophy] can in no way be 
communicated by means of words. On the contrary, it is 
only through a prolonged communion (synousia) with the 
subject, by living with it, that, like a light that is kindled 
by a flickering flame, it begins to suddenly nourish itself 
within one’s soul. 
ῥητὸν γὰρ οὐδαμῶς ἐστὶν ὡς ἄλλα μαθήματα, ἀλλ’ ἐκ 
πολλῆς συνουσίας γιγνομένης περὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα αὐτὸ 
καὶ τοῦ συζῇν ἐξαίφνης, οἷον ἀπὸ πυρὸς πηδήσαντος 
ἐξαφθὲν φῶς, ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γενόμενον αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ ἤδη 
τρέφει. (Seventh Letter 341cd)37 
We believe that Plato primarily imagined this communion with the 
subject as the kind of private dialectic modeled on athletic training 
                                                     
combination of two elements in space, or in terms of a temporal conjunction 
of two material entities. 
35 See Ferrari, Platone, Parmenide, 212, n. 45. 
36 This model can be observed in Lysis, see H. Reid, “The Art of Teaching 
Philosophy in Plato’s Lysis,” Skepsis XVI i-ii (2005): 278-287. 
37 Translation by Jonah Radding from H. Reid and M. Ralkowski, eds. Plato at 
Syracuse: Essays on Plato in Western Greece with a New Translation of the Seventh 
Letter by Jonah Radding (Parnassos Press, 2019). Even if Plato is not the author 
of the letter, it is widely believed to express the philosopher’s views. 
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that is called gymnasia in the Parmenides. And we argue that the 
dialogue itself is set up to engage readers in that gymnasia, in 
particular to get them to think beyond materialism, here 
represented by Parmenides. A full analysis of the philosophical 
problems presented by the dialectic must be left for another time, 
however. 
Conclusion 
It has been our purpose to show that Plato’s Parmenides can be 
interpreted agonistically as a constructive contest between Eleatic 
and Athenian philosophers. By setting the dialogue at the 
Panathenaic Games and using athletic language to describe its 
participants, Plato uses the athletic rivalry between Mainland and 
Western Greeks to highlight a parallel philosophical rivalry. As a 
former wrestler, Plato would envision this rivalry as constructive, 
and imagine the dialectical method, here called gymnasia, as a kind 
of philosophical training. It is a private, comprehensive, and 
challenging preparation designed to reveal the weaknesses in 
hypotheses, but also to develop the kind of “vision” described in 
Republic V, which distinguishes the philosopher from the mere 
spectator. This philosophical gymnasia resembles a round-robin 
training exercise in which the reader is called to participate. In 
Republic III, Socrates states that gymnastikē primarily benefits the 
soul (psychē, 410c), while the Parmenides offers a philosophical 
gymnasium in which all souls are invited to train. 
 
